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Order Flow Cases: Jurisdiction, Preemption and Securities Laws; Outside Counsel
Richard L. Stone and Jay Facciolo
Primary jurisdiction and preemption issues arise in securities class action litigation when alleged
violations of state law arise from conduct that is either explicitly or implicitly regulated by the
federal securities laws.
These are two distinct theories: one is a matter of administrative law and judicial economy
(primary jurisdiction); the other is a matter of constitutional law involving the Supremacy Clause
(preemption). To date, there has not been extensive case law involving preemption and the federal
securities laws (other than in the blue sky and tender offer areas) and there has been almost no case
law on primary jurisdiction and the federal securities laws.
This article discusses these issues in the context of the order flow cases.1 In the eight ongoing order
flow cases pending in state courts in Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota and New York, the
plaintiffs have challenged the practice of certain broker-dealers that make monetary and nonmonetary payments to retail brokers, particularly discount brokers, for the purpose of inducing the
retail brokers to send orders to the defendants for execution.2
The order flow cases provide a good way to examine the preemption and primary jurisdiction
issues because they have begun to generate a body of case law.
The practice of paying for order flow started in the over-the-counter market with payments made
by market makers (i.e., dealers in OTC securities) to their regional correspondent brokerage firms.
Market maker firms later began to make payments for order flow to other retail brokers until the
practice of paying for order flow became common in the OTC market.3
While payment for order flow in the OTC market has a long standing history, it is only in the past
seven years that it has spread to listed securities, starting with payments by third market makers
and then by some regional specialists.4 The Securities and Exchange Commission believes that
some integrated broker-dealer firms may now be paying for order flow. The amount paid per share
for an order is relatively small, one or two cents per share, although the aggregate amounts can be
high as between 15 percent and 20 percent of the order flow in listed stock is routed pursuant to
cash payment arrangements.
Payment for order flow has been the subject of extensive study by the SEC,5 NASD and other selfregulatory organizations,6 the Congress7 and legal and financial academics.8 A series of alleged
problems involving the structure of the securities markets,9 state agency law and the federal
securities laws have been identified by these commentators. The result has been the recent
promulgation by the SEC of new disclosure standards for payments for order flow.
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The SEC decided to mandate a three tier approach to disclosure.10 In a companion release11 to the
one promulgating the new rules and amendments, the SEC proposed rules to further broaden the
amount of disclosure.
Order Flow Cases
The complaints in the order flow cases primarily have utilized state law causes of action.12 The
plaintiffs, customers of the defendant brokerage firms, have relied on almost identical legal
theories alleging breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs, as principal, by the defendant,
as agent, and fraud upon the plaintiffs.13
The plaintiffs' claim that the defendants have violated a fiduciary relationship has turned on the
key issue of whether the plaintiffs consented to payments for order flow made to the defendants.14
The nature and quality of the disclosure made to the plaintiffs by the defendants are crucial in
determining whether consent has been given.15
The leading case has been Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co.16 The trial court's decision to dismiss
the complaint in Dahl on both preemption and primary jurisdiction grounds has been the basis for
the dismissal decision in New York.17
Dahl was decided upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this
motion, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint in all respects, because [i]t is the opinion of this court
that the application of state law to the practices in question here, [sic] would violate the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.18
The trial court noted that the practice of paying for order flow was permissible and lawful under
the federal regulatory scheme. Without discussing the legislative intent behind the Exchange Act,
the court reasoned that prohibiting the payment for order flow under Minnesota law would frustrate
the objectives of Congress as set forth in the Exchange Act.
Having held that Minnesota law was preempted by federal law, the trial court could have stopped
its analysis. Instead, it moved on the different theory of primary jurisdiction. Relying on Gordon
v. NYSE,19 the trial court held that the practice of paying for order flow is uniquely within the
competence of the SEC and, therefore, that the SEC should resolve the underlying issues raised by
payments for order flow.
Minnesota's Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court, reversed.20 The three judge panel
distinguished the separate issues of preemption and primary jurisdiction more clearly. On the
preemption issue, the panel first examined whether there was a specific conflict between either
Minnesota's blue sky law21 or its common law of agency and federal law.22 Finding that the only
federal regulation currently in effect concerning non-commission compensation is found in SEC
Rule 10b-10(a)(7)(iii), the panel held that there was no conflict because both state and federal law
could be complied with simultaneously.
The court then examined the defendant's assertion that there was an actual conflict between the
state and federal schemes because to give effect to Minnesota statutory and common law would
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be an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of
Congress.23
Without clearly stating what the Congressional purpose might be, the panel reasoned that requiring
more disclosure, for which the plaintiffs were arguing, would not affect the operation of the
securities market. In fact, the court said such additional disclosure would serve a basic purpose of
the federal laws and regulations, namely full, and fair disclosure to purchasers of securities.'24
After dealing with the preemption issue, the panel examined the primary jurisdiction question. It
noted that the SEC had not yet specifically regulated payments for order flow, which distinguished
Dahl from the Gordon case; therefore, the panel concluded that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not apply.25
In a footnote, the court specifically stated that its opinion did not reach the effect of the new SEC
rules on the preemption issue.26 Similarly, in its discussion of the primary jurisdiction issue, it
relied on the fact that [w]hile the SEC will impose regulation of order flow payments in the future,
the fact remains that there are now no specific regulations.27 Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Dahl will not have much precedential value on the preemption and primary jurisdiction
issues in any cases that challenge payments for order flow on state law grounds after the effective
date of the new SEC rules.28
In making the determination of whether to allocate the initial decision making to a court or an
administrative agency, courts consider at least four factors. Three of these factors concern an
agency's expertise and the need to insure that a uniform national regulatory scheme is not unduly
interfered with.29 The fourth factor has to do with the need or insuring a timely resolution of the
dispute.30
In arguing for the SEC's primary jurisdiction in the payment for order flow cases, the defendants'
principal claim has been that the SEC should have primary jurisdiction because of its special
expertise in this area. There are at least two problems with this argument.
First, the defendants must identify why the special expertise of the SEC is needed in these cases.
Only if intricate and technical facts are involved would a deferral to the SEC be appropriate.31 The
lack of such facts combined with the traditional expertise of courts in cases involving fraud may
explain why primary jurisdiction is rarely raised in most securities fraud cases.32
In fact, SEC investigations of violations of the federal securities laws and private civil actions
currently proceed simultaneously on a regular basis. It is difficult to square applying the primary
jurisdiction argument with the wider implications that this application would have. This is
especially so because the SEC's decisions on whether to proceed with an investigation often are
based on such factors as staff resources and public policy, which should not determine whether
any civil plaintiff or plaintiff class receives a prompt hearing of its complaint.
Second, insofar as the primary jurisdiction doctrine may be stretched to cover situations in which
the rule making, rather than the adjudicatory, function of the pertinent regulatory agency is
involved, there is no need to defer until the SEC has considered and acted upon the issues involved
in payments for order flow. The SEC has already acted in this area.33
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be applied sparingly with respect to the federal
securities laws and the SEC. Especially where the SEC's rule making capacity rather than its
adjudicatory capacity is most implicated. A court can always request the SEC to submit an amicus
brief, which normally should serve substantially the same purposes as a referral of the initial
decision making to the SEC.34
Insofar as the defendants also have argued in the various order flow cases that the plaintiffs can
make a customer complaint to the SEC or the pertinent self-regulatory organizations which could
lead to the commencement of a regulatory enforcement proceeding,35 they ignore that the SEC has
complete discretion in deciding whether to take action upon any complaint.36
The most important recent Supreme Court decision to address the issues of coordinating state and
federal law in a commercial context is O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.37 The Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, carefully delimited the reach of federal preemption.
The Court initially turned to FIRREA as the relevant federal statute and went through a two step
analysis. First, it looked for an explicit statutory provision dealing with the issue of displacement
of state law and found no such provision. Second, it examined the scope of FIRREA and found it
to be a comprehensive and detailed statute. The Court held that it would not create federal
common-law to supplement such a statutory scheme. In some of the opinion's most far reaching
language, Justice Scalia wrote that matters left unaddressed in such a [comprehensive and detailed]
scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by the state law.38
As FIRREA was enacted after the FDIC became receiver of the pertinent failed S&L, the Court
continued by asking whether assuming the inapplicability of FIRREA[,] this is one of those case
in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified.39 The Court noted that
situations in which the creation of such a special federal rule are appropriate are few and restricted,
limited to situations where there is a significant conflict between federal policy or interest and the
use of state law.'40
In examining the federal policies or interests identified by the FDIC as supporting such a special
federal rule, the Court used language casting doubt on whether the interest in uniformity would
ever alone be sufficient to warrant the creation of federal common law. The Court found that,
since the FDIC was acting in a unique capacity as a receiver and not as the U.S. government or
one of its agents or contractors, [t]here is not even at stake that most generic (and lightly invoked)
of alleged federal interests, the interest in uniformity.
This interest in uniformity did not arise in O'Melveny because the FDIC, when it was acting as a
receiver, was not the United States or one of its agents or contractors. Accordingly, California law
would be applied to primary conduct on the part of private actors that has already occurred.41 The
desire of the FDIC to eliminate uncertainty in its nationwide litigation did not qualify as a legally
cognisable interest in uniformity, sufficient to preempt state law, otherwise we would be awash in
federal common-law rules.42
Applying the Test
In most areas, the Exchange Act does not explicitly preempt state law. In fact, 28(a) of the
Exchange Act preserves state law rights and remedies.43 In addition, no provision of the Exchange
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Act or the rules promulgated thereunder, including 10(b) or 11A, explicitly displaces state law with
respect to claims arising as a result of the practice of payments for order flow.
The explicit preemption required pursuant to the O'Melveny statutory analysis is, therefore, not
currently met. When and if the new SEC rules become effective on Oct. 2, 1995, a stronger
argument for preemption will be available to future defendants. The issue will then be whether
the new SEC mandated disclosure standards explicitly preempt the state agency law requirements
for consent by principals if their agents make profits from transactions conducted on behalf of the
principals.
In adopting the new rules, the SEC discussed a broker-dealer's fiduciary duty to seek to obtain the
best execution for its customer, noting that this duty derived in part from the common law duty of
agency, which obligates an agent to act exclusively in the principal's best interest.44
In the SEC's view, the mere fact that payments were made for order flow was not determinative of
whether the duty of best execution was met. Indeed, one of the options considered and rejected
by the SEC was a complete ban upon payments for order flow.45 Thus, the stage has been set for
broker-dealers to argue that, by negative implication, the SEC has approved payments for order
flow which are made consistently with its disclosure requirements and that its new rules preempt
any state regulation of these payments.
The regulatory scheme under the Exchange Act is the sort of comprehensive and detailed scheme
described by the O'Melveny Court in the second step of its statutory analysis.46 Applying
O'Melveny, state agency law would still survive in the area of payments for order flow because
such state law is to be employed to plug holes in otherwise comprehensive federal schemes.
The third step in the O'Melveny analysis, whether there is a significant conflict between federal
policy or interest and the use of state law, should not be determinative in any future payment for
order flow cases. The brokerage industry does have grounds for making a stronger argument on
the uniformity issue than the FDIC made in O'Melveny because the SEC is a federal agency and
has a mandate to establish a national market system.
But this argument suffers from at least two major problems. First, this third step was applied in
O'Melveny only because the pertinent federal statute did not apply to the defendant's actions,
which will not be the situation in any such future cases.
Second, it is hard to identify the overriding federal interest that applying state agency law to
payments for order flow will frustrate. In several cases, potential conflicts between the federal
securities laws and state agency law have been raised and the courts have rejected the preemption
argument.47
Conclusion
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has minimal application to the payment for order flow cases.
The SEC already has studied the issue of payments for order flow in great detail and provided its
written conclusions. Insofar as additional guidance from the SEC would be useful, the courts
should seek amicus briefs from the agency.
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The brokerage industry will have a strong preemption argument once the new SEC rules are
effective; however, in the post-O'Melveny environment, where clear evidence in a statutory or
regulatory scheme of Congressional intent to preempt is necessary, the industry would be wise to
seek a clearer statement of the SEC's intent to preempt state laws and its reasons therefore.
The industry still has such an opportunity with respect to the companion release.48 If it does not
get a clear statement of the SEC's intent into the final version of the companion release, thereby
creating an unambiguous legislative history, the brokerage industry will have only itself to blame
if additional payment for order flow cases are brought.
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